Preface xii
Why Read This Book? xii
About the Author xiii
My Approach in Writing This xiii
Why Study Philosophy? xiv
Acknowledgements xvi
Part I: Preliminaries 1
1. What Is Philosophy? 2
1.1. The Ship of Theseus 2
1.2. What’s the Definition of "Philosophy"? 3
1.3. Subject Matter & Branches 4
1.4. Methods 5
1.5. Myths About Philosophy 7
2. Logic 10
2.1. Why Logic? 10
2.2. Propositions 10
2.3. The Forms of Propositions 11
2.4. Characteristics of Propositions 12
2.5. Arguments 14
2.6. Kinds of Arguments 15
2.7. Characteristics of Arguments 16
2.8. Why I Hate These Definitions 18
2.9. Some Symbols 20
2.10. Some Confusions 21
3. Critical Thinking, 1: Intellectual Virtue 25
3.1. Rationality 25
3.1.1. What Is Rationality? 25
3.1.2. Why Be Rational? 26
3.1.3. Truth Is Good for You 27
3.1.4. Irrationality Is Immoral 28
3.1.5. Some Misunderstandings 32
3.2. Objectivity 32
3.2.1. The Virtue of Objectivity 32
3.2.2. Objectivity vs. Neutrality 34
3.2.3. The Importance of Objectivity 35
3.2.4. Attacks on Objectivity 36
3.2.5. How to Be Objective 39
3.2.6. Open-mindedness vs. Dogmatism 40
3.3. Being a Good Philosophical Discussant 41
3.3.1. Be Cooperative 41
3.3.2. Be Modest 43
3.3.3. Understand Others’ Points of View 44
4. Critical Thinking, 2: Fallacies 46
4.1. Some Traditional Fallacies 46
4.2. False Fallacies 49
4.3. Fallacies You Need to Be Told About 53
5. Absolute Truth 64
5.1. What Is Relativism? 64
5.1.1. Relative vs. Absolute 64
5.1.2. Subjective vs. Objective 65
5.1.3. Opinion vs. Fact 65
5.2. Some Logical Points 66
5.2.1. The Law of Non-Contradiction 66
5.2.2. The Law of Excluded Middle 66
5.2.3. What Questions Have Answers? 67
5.3. Why Believe Relativism? 68
5.3.1. The Argument from Disagreement 68
5.3.2. The Argument from Tolerance 69
5.4. Is Relativism Coherent? 71
5.4.1. Conflicting Beliefs Can Be True? 71
5.4.2. Is Relativism Relative? 72
5.4.3. Meaningful Claims Exclude Alternatives 73
5.4.4. Opposition to Ethnocentrism Is Ethnocentric 73
5.5. What Is Truth? 74
5.5.1. The Correspondence Theory 74
5.5.2. Rival Theories 75
5.5.3. Is Everything Relative? 76
5.6. I Hate Relativism and You Should Too 77
Part II: Epistemology 79
6. Skepticism About the External World 80
6.1. Defining Skepticism 80
6.2. Skeptical Scenarios 80
6.2.1. The Dream Argument 80
6.2.2. The Brain-in-a-Vat Argument 82
6.2.3. The Deceiving God Argument 83
6.2.4. Certainty, Justification, and Craziness 83
6.3. Responses to Skepticism 84
6.3.1. Relevant Alternatives 84
6.3.2. Contextualism 87
6.3.3. Semantic Externalism 88
6.3.4. BIVH Is a Bad Theory 92
6.3.5. Direct Realism 95
6.4. Conclusion 98
7. Global Skepticism vs. Foundationalism 99
7.1. The Infinite Regress Argument 99
7.2. The Reliability Argument 100
7.3. Self-Refutation 101
7.4. The Moorean Response 103
7.5. Foundationalism 104
7.5.1. The Foundationalist View 104
7.5.2. Arguments for Foundationalism 105
7.5.3. The Argument from Arbitrariness 106
7.5.4. Two Kinds of Reasons 108
7.5.5. A Foundationalist Reply to the Reliability Argument 109
7.6. Phenomenal Conservatism 110
7.6.1. The Thesis of Phenomenal Conservatism 110
7.6.2. The Self-Defeat Argument 111
7.6.3. PC Is a Good Theory 112
7.7. Conclusion 113
8. Defining "Knowledge" 114
8.1. The Project of Analyzing "Knowledge" 114
8.2. The Traditional Analysis 115
8.3. Gettier Examples 116
8.4. Other Analyses 118
8.4.1. No False Lemmas 118
8.4.2. Reliabilism 119
8.4.3. Proper Function 120
8.4.4. Tracking 121
8.4.5. Defeasibility 123
8.5. Lessons from the Failure of Analysis 126
8.5.1. The Failure of Analysis 126
8.5.2. A Lockean Theory of Concepts 127
8.5.3. A Wittgensteinian View of Concepts 128
Part III: Metaphysics 133
9. Arguments for Theism 134
9.1. Views About God 134
9.2. The Ontological Argument 135
9.2.1. Anselm’s Argument 135
9.2.2. Descartes’ Version 136
9.2.3. The Perfect Pizza Objection 136
9.2.4. Existence Isn’t a Property 137
9.2.5. Definitional Truths 138
9.3. The Cosmological Argument 139
9.3.1. The Kalam Cosmological Argument 139
9.3.2. Reply: In Defense of Some Infinities 142
9.3.3. The Principle of Sufficient Reason 144
9.3.4. Reply: Against the PSR 145
9.4. The Argument from Design 146
9.4.1. Design and Life 146
9.4.2. Fine Tuning 148
9.4.3. Bad Objections 149
9.4.4. The Multiverse Theory 153
9.5. Pascal’s Wager 155
9.5.1. Pascal’s Argument 155
9.5.1. Objections 156
9.6. Conclusion 159
10. Arguments for Atheism 160
10.1. Cute Puzzles 160
10.1.1. Omnipotence and Immovable Stones 160
10.1.2. Omnipotence and Error 161
10.1.3. Omniscience and Free Will 161
10.2. The Burden of Proof 162
10.3. The Problem of Evil 165
10.4. Theodicies and Defenses 167
10.4.1. How Do We Know What God Values? 167
10.4.2. How Would We Know What Goodness Is? 167
10.4.3. The Lord Works in Mysterious Ways 168
10.4.4. Satan Did It 169
10.4.5. God Will Fix It 169
10.4.6. Evil Is a Mere Absence 170
10.4.7. Evil Is a Product of Free Will 171
10.4.8. Evil Is Necessary for Virtue 172
10.4.9. God Creates All Good Worlds 173
10.4.10. There Is No Best World 174
10.4.11. The World Has Infinite Value 175
10.4.12. Weakening the Conception of God 176
10.4.13. The Case of the Serial Killer 176
10.5. Conclusion 178
11. Free Will 180
11.1. The Concept of Free Will 180
11.2. Opposition to Free Will 181
11.2.1. The Theory of Determinism 181
11.2.2. Evidence for Determinism? 183
11.2.2. No Free Will Either Way 184
11.3. Deterministic Free Will 184
11.3.1. Compatibilism 184
11.3.2. Analyses of Free Will 185
11.3.3. Freedom Requires Determinism 187
11.4. Libertarian Free Will 187
11.4.1. Incompatibilism 187
11.4.2. For Free Will: The Appeal to Introspection 189
11.4.3. Free Will and Other Common Sense Judgments 190
11.4.4. For Free Will: The Self-Defeat Argument 191
11.5. Other Reflections 193
11.5.1. How Does Libertarian Free Will Work? 193
11.5.2. Degrees of Freedom 195
12. Personal Identity 196
12.1. The Teletransporter 196
12.2. The Problem of Subject Identity 197
12.2.1. Basic Question 197
12.2.2. Persons and Subjects 197
12.2.3. Two Kinds of Identity 197
12.2.4. Identity over Time 198
12.3. Theories of Personal Identity 199
12.3.1. The Body Theory 199
12.3.2. The Brain Theory 199
12.3.3. The Naïve Memory Theory 200
12.3.4. Psychological Continuity 201
12.3.5. Spatiotemporal Continuity 202
12.3.6. The No-Branching Condition 203
12.3.7. The Closest-Continuer Theory 204
12.3.8. The Soul Theory 204
12.4. In Defense of the Soul 205
12.4.1. Objections to the Soul 205
12.4.2. Principles of Identity 207
12.4.3. Only the Soul Theory Satisfies the Principles of Subject Identity 209
12.4.4. Unanswered Questions 210
Part IV: Ethics 212
13. Metaethics 213
13.1. About Ethics and Metaethics 213
13.1.1. Ethics 213
13.1.2. Metaethics 214
13.1.3. Objectivity 214
13.1.4. Five Metaethical Theories 215
13.2. What’s Wrong with Non-Cognitivism 217
13.2.1. The Non-Cognitivist View 217
13.2.2. The Linguistic Evidence 218
13.2.3. The Introspective Evidence 220
13.3. What’s Wrong with Subjectivism 220
13.3.1. The Subjectivist View 220
13.3.2. Motives for Subjectivism, 1: Tolerance 221
13.3.3. Motives for Subjectivism, 2: Cultural Variation 222
13.3.4. The Nazi Objection 223
13.4. What’s Wrong with Nihilism 224
13.4.1. The Nihilist View 224
13.4.2. Against Objective Values: The Humean Argument 225
13.4.3. Against Objective Values: The Argument from Weirdness 228
13.4.4. Nihilism Is Maximally Implausible 229
13.5. What’s Wrong with Ethical Naturalism 230
13.5.1. The Naturalist View 230
13.5.2. A Point About Meaning 231
13.5.3. Bad Theories 232
13.5.4. A Bad Analogy 232
13.6. Ethical Intuitionism 234
13.6.1. The Intuitionist View 234
13.6.2. Objection: Intuition Cannot Be Checked 235
13.6.3. Objection: Differing Intuitions 236
13.7. Conclusion 238
14. Ethical Theory, 1: Utilitarianism 240
14.1. An Ethical Puzzle 240
14.2. The Utilitarian View 241
14.3. Consequentialism 242
14.3.1. Objections to Consequentialism 242
14.3.2. For Consequentialism 246
14.4. Hedonism & Preferentism 247
14.4.1. For Hedonism or Preferentism 247
14.4.2. Against Hedonism & Preferentism 248
14.5. Impartialism 250
14.5.1. Partial vs. Impartial Ethical Theories 250
14.5.2. For Partiality 251
14.5.3. For Impartiality 252
14.6. Rule Utilitarianism 254
14.7. Conclusion 255
15. Ethical Theory, 2: Deontology 257
15.1. Absolute Deontology 257
15.1.1. Terminology 257
15.1.2. The Categorical Imperative, 1: Universalizability 258
15.1.3. The Categorical Imperative, 2: The End-in-Itself 260
15.1.3. The Doctrine of Double Effect 261
15.1.4. Rights 262
15.2. Objections to Absolutism 264
15.2.1. Extreme Consequences 264
15.2.2. Portions of a Life 265
15.2.3. Risks to Life 265
15.3. Moderate Deontology 266
15.4. Objections to Moderate Deontology 267
15.4.1. Arbitrary Cutoffs 267
15.4.2. The Aggregation Problem 267
15.5. Conclusion 268
16. Applied Ethics, 1: The Duty of Charity 270
16.1. The Shallow Pond Argument 270
16.2. Objections in Defense of Non-Giving 272
16.3. Poverty and Population 276
16.4. Effective Altruism 277
16.5. Government Policy 279
16.5.1. The Argument for Social Welfare Programs 279
16.5.2. The Charity Mugging Example 280
16.5.3. Other Problems with Government Programs 280
16.6. Conclusion 282
17. Applied Ethics, 2: Animal Ethics 283
17.1. The Case for Vegetarianism 283
17.1.1. Where Does Our Food Come From? 283
17.1.2. The Argument from Suffering 284
17.1.3. Arguments by Analogy 285
17.1.4. Animal Rights vs. Welfare 286
17.2. Defenses of Meat-Eating 287
17.3. Other Ethical Issues 297
17.3.1. The Importance of Factory Farm Meat 297
17.3.2. Other Animal Products 297
17.3.3. Humane Animal Products 298
17.3.4. Insentient Animals 298
17.3.5. Lab Grown Meat 299
17.3.6. Animal Experimentation 299
17.3.7. Responding to Other People’s Immorality 300
18. Concluding Thoughts 302
18.1. What Was this Book Good For? 302
18.2. How Good Philosophers Think 303
18.3. Further Reading 304
Appendix: A Guide to Writing 305
A.1. The Content of a Philosophy Paper 305
A.2. Style 305
A.3. Research 307
A.4. Misused Words 308
A.5. Punctuation & Formatting 311
A.6. Grammar 312
A.7. Other Bad Writing 313
A.8. Recommended Reading 315
Glossary 316